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1. Introduction 
 Over the past three decades, the Biotechnology and Pharmaceutical industry has had 
the largest growth rate of any sector in the U.S. economy.  Currently, the largest 10 companies 
have a market cap of over 700 billion dollars.  In the past 20 years, Biotech has outperformed 
the Standard and Poor’s 500 index earning superior returns for those willing to invest in this 
risky, high growth industry (Bloomberg L.P.).  This upward trend is expected to continue as both 
institutional and private investment in biotech continues to soar.   
The Pharmaceutical and Biotechnology industries function uniquely due to their high 
level of regulation.  The government, more specifically the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), 
has a direct impact on the success of a pharmaceutical company.  Before a drug can be taken to 
market it must first pass the three phases of FDA approval:  Phase I, Phase II, and Phase III.   
Phase I consists of a sample of 20 to 200 patients and is used to determine whether or 
not the drug is safe for human consumption (Office of the Commissioner).  It uses ascending 
nonclinical doses administered by a clinical researcher on primarily healthy patients (Office of 
the Commissioner).  Approximately 70% of applications make it through this stage (Office of the 
Commissioner).  Phase II has a larger sample of 100 to 300 patients who are administered a 
therapeutic level dose of the drug, again by a clinical researcher (Office of the Commissioner).  
In this phase, the researcher is testing for the drug’s efficacy and side effects, by testing on 
patients with specific health conditions (Office of the Commissioner).  Only 33% of drugs make 
it through Phase II testing (Office of the Commissioner).  In Phase III it is assumed that the drug 
is effective and must be tested on a wider scale of 300 to 3000 patients.  Approximately only 
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25% of drugs that enter Phase III are ultimately approved and can be taken to market (Office of 
the Commissioner). 
 Getting a drug approved is extremely expensive, often costing up to 2.6 billion dollars 
(Dimasi 2006).  According to the FDA’s own estimate only about six out of 100 drugs that enter 
Phase I will ultimately be approved.  Given the high upfront capital expenditure and the 
uncertainty of future cash flows it is difficult to understand why a company would undertake 
such a herculean effort.  Simply put, the prospect of bringing a new drug to market is exciting.  
A successful drug is a potentially massive source of income for its creator.  A new banner drug 
like Humira, Viagra, or Crestor could have a lifetime revenue in the hundreds of billions.  
Pharma and Biotech are big business and Wall Street knows this; however, due to this 
high degree of uncertainty, the market has a difficult time effectively pricing this class of stock.  
A successful Phase III approval can double a company’s market cap.  Spark Therapeutics stock 
price more than doubled from $50 to $113 in February of 2019 with the approval of its banner 
drug (see Attachment 1).  A failure, however, can be catastrophic.  Biogen, a large 
pharmaceutical company saw its market capitalization1 fall by over a third (see Attachment 2) in 
the March of 2019.  Across both approval and rejection events, those who trade equities saw 
the potential for massive gains.  
 The largest insider trading scandal in the history of the stock market surrounded a 
biotechnology approval.  Steven Cohen and his firm SAC Capital were long2 700 million dollars 
on Elan, an Irish biotechnology company (Keefe 2017).  Elan had submitted the most exciting 
                                                     
1 Market Capitalization- Value in totality of a company’s ownership shares outstanding 
2 Long- to be long means to own and thus bet on the value of a company’s stock to rise. 
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Alzheimer’s drug of all time.  Alzheimer’s has no cure and is famously difficult to treat.  Bringing 
a viable Alzheimer’s drug to market would be a veritable gold mine.  When the firm 
underhandedly learned of the drugs upcoming disappointing results, they not only liquidated, 
but also reversed their position.  They shorted3 the company’s stock, and made an illegal profit 
of 275 million dollars (Keefe 2017). 
 A better understanding of the FDA approval process and the way a company’s stock 
price fluctuates in the time surrounding approvals can yield practitioners a unique advantage in 
their pursuit of profits.  I hypothesize that biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies return 
data surrounding Phase III FDA approvals will mimic the announcement effects traditionally 
surrounding quarterly earnings.  I also predict that less transparent firms will experience 
greater cumulative abnormal returns, yielding negative and significant coefficients on all three 
transparency measures: press releases one year prior to approval, analyst coverage, and the 
cumulative abnormal return associated with the firm’s regular quarterly earnings 
announcements. 
 The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 provides a summary of the theory 
and literature review, Section 3 describes the data, Section 4 analyzes the data and explains the 
results, and Section 5 concludes. 
2. Theory and Literature Review 
 The efficient market hypothesis states that markets are “efficient”, meaning that market 
prices fully reflect all available information (Fama 1970).  The price of a stock should reflect the 
expected future value of the firm’s cash flows.  In this framework, there are two types of risk: 
                                                     
3 Short- to short means to bet against, and thus yield profit when a company’s share price falls 
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unsystematic risk and systematic risk.  Unsystematic risk, also known as specific risk, is the risk 
associated with owning a specific security or investing in a specific industry.  Imagine a 
hypothetical individual whose entire portfolio consisted of one security, say Boeing.  Given its 
recent aircraft failures, Boeing saw a massive drop in stock price.  Holding any one security 
exposes the owner to that securities unsystematic risk.  Imagine if rather than investing solely 
in Boeing the hypothetical individual owned the stock of many companies in his portfolio.  The 
individual would be less exposed to the drop in Boeing’s stock price.  The more stocks an 
individual’s portfolio the lower the unsystematic risk of the portfolio.  In an efficient market, all 
unsystematic risk can be effectively eliminated via diversification.  Systematic risk, also known 
as market risk, is the uncertainty inherent in putting one’s money in the market.  All stocks that 
are traded are subject to changes in price when there are broad market movements.  The 
measure of a stock’s responsiveness to the market is called its beta.  The risk of a portfolio can 
be lowered to solely its systematic risk through diversification4.  
This idea gave birth to capital asset pricing.  Capital asset pricing theory aims to model 
the expected returns of given securities.  According to this theory because unsystematic risk 
                                                     
4 
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can be eliminated via portfolio construction, the only risk a shareholder must be compensated 
for is systematic risk.  By controlling for the factor of the market and adjusting for the current 
risk-free rate of return5, it is possible to measure expected returns (Sharpe 1964).  The first and 
least restrictive model is the Market Model: 
ri = rf  + β1  (rm  -  rf) 
ri : Expected Return on a given security 
rf : Risk-free rate 
rm : Return on the market 
 
This model is able to predict the return on a specific security.  This was the prevailing theory for 
many years and by its virtue practitioners were able to create the security market line6 and 
determine return for any given stock given its beta.  The model had an issue, stocks were 
earning return in excess of risk.  Return in excess of predicted risk is called alpha6 and in an 
efficient market this should not exist.  Efficient market theorists believe that it is impossible to 
beat the market and that any excess return must be due to some unseen risk. 
                                                     
5 The primary metric for estimating the risk free rate is the yield on 10 year treasury strips. Currently it is 
approximately 2.5%. 
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 In 1993 Eugene Fama and Kenneth French pioneered the Fama French Three Factor 
Model: 
ri  =  rf  + β1  (rm -  rf) + β2 (SMB) + β3 (HML) + ε 
ri : Expected Return on a given security 
rf : Risk-free rate 
rm : Return on the market 
SMB: Size Premium, returns small cap minus large cap 
companies 
HML: book to market premium, High book to market minus low 
book to market 
 
 This model adds two new risk factors small minus big and high book to market minus low book 
to market.  This model assumes that smaller cap companies are inherently riskier than larger 
cap companies and that companies with higher book to market are intrinsically less risky than 
low book to market companies.  This model controls for size and book to market value.  
Proponents of the efficient market hypothesis argue that those factors represent risk factors 
that must be accounted for when estimating the price of a stock (Fama 1993).  Theoretically, 
this variation of the CAPM should, with higher accuracy, predict the price of any given stock.  
This model was the standard until it was updated to include a fourth factor for momentum: 
ri  =  rf  + β1  (rm -  rf) + β2 (SMB) + β3 (HML) + β4 (Momentum)  +ε 
ri : Expected Return on a given security 
rf : Risk free rate 
rm : Return on the market 
SMB: Size Premium, returns small cap minus large cap 
companies 
HML: book to market premium, High book to market minus low 
book to market 
Momentum: Current trend upward or downward 
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Momentum describes the propensity of a company’s stock price to continue rising if it is going 
up and to continue declining if it is going down.  This is the final and most restrictive model.  
Examining the difference between expected returns as predicted by these models and actual 
daily returns yields a value for cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) (Brown 1985).  The time 
leading up to and surrounding an event yields robust data for the effect of that event on the 
price of a security. 
The efficient market hypothesis is widely accepted; however, some of its key 
assumptions are not met when applied to Pharmaceutical and Biotechnology companies.  In 
order for efficiency to hold, not only must all knowledge be widely disseminated, but it also 
must be scrutable to those who receive it.  While much Pharmaceutical and Biotechnology data 
is publicly available, it requires expert knowledge to understand, such that it is useless to the 
general public due to information complexity (Janney 2003).  This creates systematic 
inefficiencies in the market due to the complexity of the information. 
 Not only private individuals fall victim to this knowledge gap; it is estimated that 
anywhere from 35% to 40% of all publicly traded companies have no analysts assigned to cover 
them.  This dearth of coverage means that these innovative, high growth potential companies 
are often not understood, even by institutional investors (Canviet 2010).  This misalignment of 
value is further driven by the ambiguity as to the effectiveness of the drug being developed and 
the uncertainty of the FDA approval process.  Many of these companies do not expect to have 
cash flows of any kind for, in some cases, many years.  Investments in this class of companies 
are speculative and thus riddled with predictable irrational market behaviors.  With a better 
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understanding of these market concepts, it is possible to net high abnormal returns in excess of 
risk. 
 Examinations of announcement effects have long been examined in both finance and 
economics literature.  Early studies focused primarily on the impact of major financial 
announcements like the establishment of a dividend or a firm’s regular quarterly earnings 
announcements.  One of the earliest papers that measured announcement effects associated 
with earnings was published by William H.  Beaver (1968).  In his paper, he challenges Miller 
and Modigliani’s (1963) assertions that firm announcements about earnings lack informational 
value because there are often major measurement errors and other indicators convey firm 
performance in a timelier manner.  At the time, the prevailing wisdom was that the market 
would have already processed that information and reflected it in its share price. 
This assertion implies that earnings reports convey little the market does not already 
know, and thus should not affect the price of a company’s securities.  His data set included 143 
firms traded on the New York Stock Exchange with a total of 506 earnings announcements.  He 
measured the stocks over a 17 week period surrounding the announcement with week t=0 
being the week of the announcement and weeks t= -8 and t= +8 the eighth week directly 
preceding and following, respectively.  Beaver found that in week t=0 the volume of trading 
increased, as did price volatility.  This effect was coupled with decreased activity in weeks -8 
through -1 and increased activity in week +1 through week +8.  During week zero and the weeks 
immediately following, the market violated “semi-strong efficiency” and abnormal returns were 
realized.  These types of abnormal returns surrounding earnings announcements have been 
corroborated in both the United States and abroad and have remained congruent over time 
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(Landsman and Maydew 2002, Oopong 1995, Syed 2017).  Similar results are also exhibited 
surrounding announcements regarding dividends and special dividends across firms both 
domestic and abroad (Dewentner 1998). 
 Financial disclosures are not the only important announcements for Pharmaceutical and 
Biotechnology companies.  FDA approval is an important step in the life cycle of these firms.  
Rothenstien et. al (2011) examined the effect of Phase 3 FDA approval on the stock prices.  
They examined 109 FDA trials and regulatory decisions.  They found that the average price of a 
stock in the 4-month period rose 13.7% prior to a positive release.  Announcement effects are 
seemingly present even before the announcement is made.  Similar findings show that the 
market largely overreacts post-release.  Salil Sarkar and Pieter Jong (2006) find in an analysis of 
189 firms that markets respond positively when the FDA approves a drug and negatively when 
the FDA signals negatively.  This effect has a greater magnitude for negative information.  This 
aligns with research on investor psychology (Wilcox 1998). 
 Similar results were noted by Thomas Hwang (2013) in a smaller data set of 24 
regulatory decisions across all phases.  His sample was primarily large U.S. Biotechnology 
companies with drugs in the Oncology and Neurology space.  Hwang found positive and 
significant abnormal returns surrounding positives decisions and negative significant abnormal 
within a two-day window of the event.  His paper differed in that he found that abnormal 
returns did not differ significantly by triall phase.  Congruent with previous research, it was 
determined that negative overreactions were of greater magnitude than positive overreactions.  
Hwang’s assertions were corroborated by Anurag Sharma (2014), with a larger sample and a 
longer event window of 21 days.   
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 Transparency should lower cumulative abnormal returns.  The efficient market 
hypothesis states that market prices reflect all available information (Fama 1970).  The more 
information that is publicly available the more able the market should be to appropriately price 
the stock.  The more information put out by firm the more likely it is that the trading price will 
reflect the true value.  This decreases the likelihood of cumulative abnormal returns.   
3. Data 
The data for this study was collected from many sources.  The sample consisted of 260 
Phase III approvals from 150 companies from 2009 to 2018.  To collect this data I gathered 
approval dates and company names and stock tickers from the FDA Orange Book and 
Biopharmcatalyst.com.  With the dates and tickers, I was able to use the Wharton Data 
Research services to pull the cumulative abnormal returns surrounding each approval.  For this 
estimation, the online research tool tracked the trading history of each company’s stock for 100 
days to “estimate the expected return and residual return variance” (Wharton Research Data 
Services).  The sample consisted of companies with 70 valid trading days within this 100-day 
window.  The program uses a 50 trading day gap between the tracking period and the 
estimation period.  This limits the “likelihood that the risk model estimation is affected by the 
event-induced return variance” (Wharton Research Data Services).  For this study two 
estimation windows were used, a three day window (one day prior to and one day after the 
approval, which will be referred to as -1, +1) and a seven day window (three days prior to and 
three days after the approval, which will be referred to as -3, +3).  The data service then 
automatically calculates the expected return using various asset pricing models.  This paper will 
focus on the least restrictive, the Market Model, and the most restrictive, the Fama French Plus 
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Momentum Model.  Then the data service subtracts then subtracts the expected return from 
the actual return experienced in the estimation window.  This value is the cumulative abnormal 
returns.  I then took the absolute value of the Cumulative abnormal return to measure the 
absolute degree of the change independent of direction and winsorized7 the highest five 
percent of the sample 
I used three variables as a proxy for transparency: company press release made within 
the year to The Phase III announcement, number of analysts covering8 the stock at the time of 
approval, and the absolute value of the average cumulative abnormal return surrounding the 
four quarterly earnings announcements made prior to the Phase III announcement.  The 
Security and Exchange Commission mandates all publicly traded companies report both 
quarterly (using a 10-K form) and yearly (using a 10-Q form) to report the status of the 
business.  Firms can opt to use a press release (using an 8-K) form to report additional 
information.  The more transparent the firm the greater number of 8-Ks it will file.  I predicted 
that the beta associated with press releases would be negative and significant. 
 I used the number of analyst covering a firm at the time of announcement.  Coverage 
Studies in the past have used this metric as a measure of information asymmetry9 (Chang 
2006).  There is strong evidence supporting the notion that the number of analysts covering a 
firm is negatively correlated with the information asymmetry of a given firm (Chang 2006).  The 
                                                     
7 Winsorize- to eliminate outliers and replace them with the observations closest to them (Hargrave 2018).  
This is done to limit the effect of abnormal extreme values, or outliers, on the calculation (Hargrave 2018). 
8 Analyst Coverage- A stock is covered when sell-side analyst publishes research reports and investment 
recommendations for clients. 
9 Information Asymmetry- information relating to a transaction in which one party has relevant 
information that is not known by or available to the other party 
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more analyst covering a firm, the more information there should be available on that firm, 
increasing transparency.  This was collected using the Analyst recommendation function on 
Bloomberg.  This page displays research analysis from each analyst covering a firm.  For each 
company in the data set I counted the number of analysts that covered the stock on the 
approval date. I predicted that the beta associated with analyst coverage would be negative 
and significant.  
The final metric used for transparency was the cumulative abnormal returns 
surrounding a firms quarterly earnings announcements.  These quarterly announcements often 
contain major business updates.  Large price reactions surrounding quarterly earning imply 
reports that are highly informative.  I hypothesized that the more information that exists about 
a firm the more effectively it can be priced and thus the less likely you are to pick up cumulative 
abnormal returns in the future surrounding the Phase III announcement.  To collect this data I 
used the COMPUSTAT data set and the previously gathered company tickers and found the 
quarterly earnings announcement dates.  Next, I ran 4 WRDS event studies for each earnings 
announcement one year prior to approval.  It was necessary to match the window of the 
dependent variable to the window of the independent variable; as such, it was necessary to 
have estimates for both window lengths across both models (Market and Fama French Plus 
Momentum Model).  Then, I averaged the absolute value of the four for a single cumulative 
abnormal return value.  All three transparency measures were winsorized.  
From COMPUSTAT I also collected values for each company’s total assets, capital 
expenditures, earnings per share, net income, operating income after depreciation, in-process 
research and development, and sales, all of which were winsorized (see Table One for variable 
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names and descriptions).  The average firm in the sample has $29.34 million in assets, $7.25 
million in sales annually, and earns a net income of $1.29 million per year (See Table Two for 
descriptive statistics on all key variables). 
4. Results 
Table Three is a correlation matrix for all key variables.  The correlation matrix revealed 
interesting significant correlations between the return variables and the transparency variables: 
analyst coverage, press releases, and the cumulative abnormal returns surrounding earnings 
announcements.  I hypothesize that there would be significant and negative coefficients on all 
transparency variables. 
 Table Four shows results of all OLS regressions using -1, +1 Market Model cumulative 
abnormal returns.  The first condition regressed Market Model cumulative abnormal returns 
against the natural log of analyst coverage: 
1) MM +1,-1 CAR = α+ β1 ( Ln Coverage ) + μ 
This yielded a negative and significant beta value of -0.035 (p<0.01).  This means that as analyst 
coverage increases by one percent the cumulative abnormal returns should be lowered by 
0.035%.  While this may seem small in magnitude given the potentially large size of investments 
an increased return of 0.035% can yield large monetary rewards in excess of risk.  Then, I 
regressed the same dependent variable against the natural log of press releases:  
2) MM -1, +1 CAR = α+ β1 ( Ln 8-Ks ) + μ 
This yielded a non-significant negative coefficient of -0.012 which is consistent with its 
predicted direction.  Next, I used both regressors in a combined test: 
3) MM -1, +1 CAR = α+ β1 ( Ln Coverage ) + β2 ( Ln 8-Ks ) + μ 
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This yielded a -0.034 (p<0.01) beta for coverage and a negative non-significant beta of -0.010 
for the number of press releases. 
For robustness and to see if the effect diminished I extended the estimation window to -
3, +3 (see Table Five).  Not only did the effect persist but it became more pronounced (Table 
Four shows results of all OLS regressions using -3, +3 Market Model cumulative abnormal 
returns).  I first regressed the wider window Market Model cumulative abnormal returns 
against the natural log of analyst coverage: 
6) MM -3, +3 CAR = α+ β1 ( Ln Coverage ) + μ 
The magnitude of the coefficient on coverage increased -0.056 (p<0.01).  In this larger window, 
a one percent increase in analyst coverage decreased cumulative abnormal returns by 0.056%.  
Then, I regressed the same dependent variable against the natural log of press releases:  
7) MM -3, +3 CAR = α+ β1 ( Ln 8-Ks ) + μ 
Again this yielded a non-significant beta, -0.017, in the direction I predicted.  Next, I ran a joint 
test with both regressors: 
8) MM -3, +3 CAR = α+ β1 ( Ln Coverage ) + β2 ( Ln 8-Ks ) + μ 
This yielded a -0.055 (p<0.01) coefficient for coverage and a negative non-significant coefficient 
of -0.014. 
 The Market Model is the least restrictive model.  It is possible that the magnitude of the 
cumulative abnormal return is lesser than is being predicted in my dependent variable and as 
such all of my coefficients are inherently flawed.  The Market Model does not control for known 
risk factors such as company size, book to market ratio, or trends in stock prices.  Companies 
that are smaller are inherently riskier as are companies with high book to market ratios and 
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stock prices tend to demonstrate momentum in the short run.  In an effort to assuage this 
concern I ran the same analysis with the most restrictive model, the Fama French Plus 
Momentum Model.  Table Six shows results of all OLS regressions using -1, + Fama French Plus 
Model cumulative abnormal returns. 
In my first regression I regressed Fama French Plus Momentum Model cumulative 
abnormal returns against the natural log of analyst coverage: 
11) FFPM +1,-1 CAR = α+ β1 ( Ln Coverage ) + μ 
This yielded a negative and significant beta value of -0.036 (p<0.01) greater in magnitude than 
the Market Model.  This means that a one percent change in analyst coverage lowers 
cumulative abnormal returns by .036% Then, I regressed the same dependent variable against 
the natural log of press releases:  
12) FFPM -1, +1 CAR = α+ β1 ( Ln 8-Ks ) + μ 
This yielded a non-significant negative coefficient of -0.012 the direction I predicted.  
Next, I tested both regressors: 
13) FFPM -1, +1 CAR = α+ β1 ( Ln Coverage ) + β2 ( Ln 8-Ks ) + μ 
This yielded a -0.036 (p<0.01) beta for coverage and a negative non-significant beta of -0.010 
for the number of press releases. 
For robustness and again to see if the effect diminished I extended the estimation 
window to -3, +3.  Table Seven shows results of all OLS regressions using -3, +3 Fama French 
Plus Momentum Model cumulative abnormal returns).  In this condition I first regressed Fama 
French Plus Momentum Model cumulative abnormal returns against the natural log of analyst 
coverage: 
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16)  FFPM -3, +3 CAR = α+ β1 ( Ln Coverage ) + μ 
The magnitude of the coefficient on coverage again increased to -0.054 (p<0.01).  In this larger 
window, a one percent increase in analyst coverage decreased cumulative abnormal returns by 
0.054%.  Then, I regressed the same dependent variable against the natural log of press 
releases:  
17) FFPM -3, +3 CAR = α+ β1 ( Ln 8-Ks ) + μ 
Again this yielded a non-significant beta, -0.021, in the direction I predicted.  Next, I ran a 
joint test with both regressors: 
18)  FFPM -3, +3 CAR = α+ β1 ( Ln Coverage ) + β2 ( Ln 8-Ks ) + μ 
This yielded a -0.054 (p<.01) beta for coverage and a negative non-significant beta of -0.018 for 
the number of press releases. 
Next, I aimed to quantify the effect of cumulative abnormal returns surrounding 
earnings announcements.  I hypothesized that the beta would be significant and negative.  It 
was my expectation that more informative quarterly earnings would cause broad movements in 
stock price, yielding cumulative abnormal returns surrounding these announcements.  The 
more information available in the market prior to the Phase III approval the more informative 
the firm is and thus the lower cumulative abnormal surrounding the approval. 
First, I used the least restrictive model, the Market Model, regressing Market Model 
cumulative abnormal returns surrounding earnings announcement during the prior year against 
cumulative abnormal returns surrounding Phase III approval (see Table Four): 
4) MM -1, +1 CAR = α+ β1 ( CAR Earnings -1,+1 ) + μ 
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This yielded a positive significant beta of 0.280 (p<.01).  This means that a one unit change in 
cumulative abnormal returns surrounding earnings increased cumulative abnormal returns 
surrounding approval by 0.280.  For robustness increased the window to -3, +3 (see Table Five):  
9) MM -3, +3 CAR = α+ β1 ( CAR Earnings -3, +3) + μ 
This yielded a positive and significant coefficient of .379 (p<0.01). 
 Next, I moved to the Fama French Plus Momentum Model.  I began by regressing the 
Fama French Plus Momentum Model cumulative abnormal returns with a -1, +1 window against 
cumulative abnormal returns surrounding Phase III approval (see Table Six): 
14) FFPM -1, +1 CAR = α+ β1 ( CAR Earnings -1,+1 ) + μ 
This yielded a positive significant beta of 0.283 (p<0.01).  For robustness increased the window 
to -3, +3 (see Table Seven):  
19) FFPM -3, +3 CAR = α+ β1 ( CAR Earnings -3, +3) + μ 
This yielded a positive and significant beta of 0.365 (p<0.01). 
 In all models across all windows the variable for cumulative abnormal returns 
surrounding quarterly earnings announcements is added to the other transparency variables 
the coefficient  for coverage remains negative and significant (p<0.01) and the coefficient on 
cumulative abnormal return surrounding earnings announcements remains positive and 
significant (p<0.01), while both decrease in magnitude.  The beta on Press Releases was always 
negative and non-significant (see Tables Four, Five, Six, and Seven). 
I next aimed to examine if there was a difference between firms that were highly 
transparent and firms that were exceptionally tight-lipped.  For the rest of my analysis, I used 
only the -1, +1 day window cumulative abnormal returns from the Fama French Plus 
Momentum Model.  I broke down each of my key transparency variables into above and below 
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median (see Table Eight).  Firms above median in press releases did not see significantly 
different cumulative abnormal returns surrounding Phase III approval.  Analyst coverage, 
however, bore more interesting results.  In both models there were significantly higher 
cumulative abnormal returns for firms that were above median.  In the Market Model, below 
median analyst coverage firms averaged cumulative abnormal returns of 0.04892 and above 
median firms returned only 0.02684 making the difference 0.02207.  To test this difference, in 
this condition and in all following conditions I used an independent sample T-test.  This 
difference was statistically significant with a p-value less than 0.01 (see table 8).  The same 
principle holds true in the more restrictive Fama French Plus Momentum Model, albeit with a 
lower magnitude.  Below median covered firms averaged cumulative abnormal of 0.04841 and 
above median firms returned only 0.02690, making the difference .02151.  This difference was 
statistically significant with a p-value less than .01.  The effect of cumulative abnormal returns 
surrounding earnings produced opposite results.  Above median firm in this category, using the 
Market Model saw returns averaging at 0.04753, 0.01930 greater than below median firms 
which saw returns of only 0.02824.  The difference between the two groups was statistically 
significant (p<.05).  The same was true for the Fama French Plus Momentum Model (see Table 
Eight).   
Based on these results I created two new variables: the high transparency firm and the 
low transparency firm (see Table Nine).  In order to qualify as low transparency the firm had to 
have below the median values for all three transparency measures, press releases, analyst 
coverage, and cumulative abnormal returns surrounding earnings (see Table Nine).  Conversely, 
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the high transparency firm was required to be above the median in all three categories.  In my 
sample there were 12 low transparency firms and 23 high transparency firms. 
Both high and low transparency firms experienced cumulative abnormal returns 
surrounding their Phase III announcement.  The low transparency firms, on average, saw 
Market Model cumulative abnormal returns of 0.08418 while the high transparency firms saw 
cumulative abnormal returns of only 0.04868 a statistically significant difference (p<0.05).  The 
returns when the Fama French Plus Momentum Model was applied also had a statistically 
significant difference (p<0.05).  Low transparency firms had cumulative abnormal returns 
0.07778 while high transparency firms saw returns of only 0.04759.  When I added a dummy 
variable for least transparent firm to the full Fama French Plus Momentum Model regression it 
generated a positive and significant beta of 0.022 (p<0.05) (see Table Ten).  This means that the 
less transparent firms typically experience greater cumulative abnormal returns. 
This led me to wonder if there was a nonlinear relationship between any of the 
transparency measures and my cumulative abnormal return variables.  First I ran a regression of 
Fama French Plus Momentum Model -1, +1 cumulative abnormal returns against analyst 
coverage and analyst coverage squared (see Table Eleven): 
23) FFPM -1, +1 CAR = α+ β1 ( Ln Coverage ) + β2 ( Ln Coverage2 ) + μ 
This yielded interesting results.  The sign on the beta associated with coverage switched from    
-0.036 (p<0.01) to 0.057 (p<0.05) and the beta on squared coverage was -0.047 (p<0.01). This 
seemingly implies a non-linear relationship.  After examining the relationship further the 
maximum of the model peaks at firms with two covering analysts.  Given that my sample has so 
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few examples of this I feel the relationship, while interesting and plausible, may be spurious 
(see Chart One).  
 The final test I ran was an interaction between my analyst coverage variable and my 
quarterly earnings cumulative abnormal returns with Fama French Plus Momentum Model -1, 
+1 cumulative returns as the dependent variable: 
24) FFPM -1, +1 CAR = α+ β1 ( Ln Coverage ) + β2 ( CAR Earnings -1,+1) 
25) FFPM -1, +1 CAR = α+ β1 ( Ln Coverage ) + β2 ( CAR Earnings -1,+1) + β3 ( Ln Coverage* CAR 
Earnings -1,+1) + μ 
The first regression (without the interaction) bore coefficients of -0.035 on coverage (p<0.01) 
and 0.0145 on earnings (p<0.05) (see Table Twelve).  The regression with interaction term 
yielded different results.  The coverage beta increased in magnitude to -0.043 (p<0.01).  The 
beta on quarterly earnings cumulative abnormal returns flipped signs to -0.016 and lost its 
significance.  The interaction term had a non-significant beta of 0.155  
5. Conclusions 
Cumulative abnormal returns on company stocks exist from the least restrictive pricing 
model (the Market Model) to the most restrictive generally accepted pricing model (the Fama 
French Plus Momentum Model).  The markets respond so positively that the returns subsist 
from the -1, +1 window to the -3, +3 window.   
 My hypothesis surrounding analyst coverage rang true.  Across all models and time 
windows the beta associate with coverage remained significant and negative.  Analyst coverage 
acts as an effective proxy for transparency as both retail and institutional investors follow the 
guidance of informed analysts.  This effect is likely exacerbated, as analyst coverage is also a 
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proxy for general institutional awareness of the firm’s existence.  When I examined my findings 
surrounding a potential nonlinear relationship between coverage and cumulative abnormal 
returns while potential spurious the data suggested that firms with two or less analyst covering 
them at the time of approval saw positive returns to an increase in analyst coverage.  My 
sample, unfortunately, had too few examples of this class of company to derive meaningful 
conclusions from this enhanced model.  While my sample was limited in this way it did capture 
the majority of Phase III approvals from 2009- 2018.  Given this comprehensive makeup, I posit 
that the dearth of firms with 0-2 analyst covering them was a function of the rarity of the 
situation rather than a limitation of my sample.  A firm that makes it through Phase I, and II and 
into Phase III without gathering the attention of analyst, many of whom specialize by industry, 
seems like a major oddity.  An examination of these extremely under covered firms deserves 
more attention.  It may be necessary to extend the timeframe of the sample to gather sufficient 
data.  
While I was correct regarding the directionality of the beta associated with press 
releases one year prior to approval across all models and windows this metric never yielded 
significant data.  It is possible that press releases are not an effective measure for transparency 
because they can cover many different corporate events and announcements.  A large number 
of press releases released in a given year means that the firm is extremely communicative but 
does not necessarily guarantee that the information released is substantive.  A firm is required 
to release an 8-K whenever it communicates material information10 to the public.  The 
definition of material is vague and as such can mean many different things.  A firm may release 
                                                     
10 Any information about a company that may cause a change in the price of a share of its stock 
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an 8-K for anything a minor change in company bylaws, to a major change like the hiring or 
firing of a key executive.  Using the sheer number that a company releases may not be a viable 
measure for transparency.  Ideally, if there was a way to quantify the information content of 
each individual press release on a scale from uninformative to highly informative that would 
much improve the validity of the measure.  I predict this may yield similar results to my findings 
regarding analyst coverage.  
My hypothesis surrounding cumulative abnormal returns surrounding earnings 
announcements was incorrect.  The beta with which it was associated was consistently positive 
and significant (barring the interaction), the opposite of what I expected.  Rather than 
decreasing cumulative abnormal returns surrounding Phase III approval, firms with larger 
cumulative abnormal returns surrounding earnings actually saw larger returns.  I expected that 
firms with greater quarterly cumulative abnormal returns had earnings reports that were 
inherently more informative.  The more information in the quarterly earnings report the 
greater expected cumulative abnormal return surrounding the report should be.  More 
informative reports mean more information about the firm exists and the more effectively the 
stock should be priced.  These assumptions did not hold true.  This area deserves more 
attention. 
This research helps illuminate a potential risk factor for which stock pricing methods 
could be adjusted to increase their accuracy: transparency.  While it is difficult to quantify firms 
that have positive fundamentals but are less transparent have potential for excess returns.  This 
paper affirms that analyst coverage is an appropriate proxy for transparency and as such 
absolute return managers may benefit from seeking out under covered companies.   
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There are also implications from a policy perspective.  If efficiency and price discovery is 
the goal of markets then pharmaceutical and biotechnology company’s deserve special 
attention.  Efficiency could through improved by the enforcement of a mechanism to either 
mandate or encourage increased transparency from these types of firms.  Increased 
transparency would eliminate a good deal of randomness from stock selection and allow 
institutions and retail investors to more effectively allocate their capital.  Uncertainty decreases 
the amount a person is willing to pay for something regardless of its inherent worth.  The 
market can more effectively price a good the more they understand about the good, whether it 
be a real good or a financial one.  Given the large potential cash inflows and high degree of 
uncertainty from a Phase III drug approval announcements, all parties benefit from decreasing 
this information asymmetry.  Periodic data releases and potentially mandated incremental 
reports to company shareholders should increase overall market efficiency.  A more informed 
market is a more efficient market, and this is especially true for the pharmaceutical and 
biotechnology industry.   
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Attachment 1: Spark Therapeutics 
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Attachment 2: Biogen 
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Attachment 3: Visual Representation of Likelihood of Approval 
Phase I: 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Phase II: 
 
 
 
 
 
Phase III: 
 
 
= Denied 
= Approved 
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Table 1: Variable Names and Descriptions 
 
Variable Name Description
8Ks Press Releases (8Ks) 1 year prior to approval
Coverage # of Analyst Covering company at the announcement +1
Phase 3 Approval Anncmt. 
Return: MM [-3,+3]
Absolute Value of Market Model Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
Surrounding Phase 3 approvals [-3,+3]
Phase 3 Approval Anncmt. 
Return: MM [-1,+1]
Absolute Value of Market Model Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
Surrounding Phase 3 approvals [-1,+1]
Phase 3 Approval Anncmt. 
Return: FFPM [-3,+3]
Absolute Value of Fama French Plus Mometum Cumulative 
Abnormal Returns Surrounding Phase 3 approvals [-3,+3]
Phase 3 Approval Anncmt. 
Return:FFPM [-1,+1]
Absolute Value of Fama French Plus Mometum Cumulative 
Abnormal Returns Surrounding Phase 3 approvals [-1,+1]
Ln8ks Natural Log of Press Releases (8Ks) 1 year prior to approval + 1
LnCoverage
Natural Log of # of Analyst Covering company at the 
announcement +1
Total Assets Total Assets
CAPEX Capital Expenditures 
EPS EPS Diluted Including Extraordinary Items
Net Income Net Income
Operating Income Operating Income After Depreciation
R+D In Process R+D
Sales Sales
Earnings  Anncmt. Return: 
MM [-1,+1]
Average Absolute Value of Market Model Cumulative Abnormal 
Returns Surrounding Quarterly Earnings Announcement [-1,+1]
Earnings  Anncmt. Return: 
MM [-3,+3]
Average Absolute Value of Market Model Cumulative Abnormal 
Returns Surrounding Quarterly Earnings Announcement [-3,+3]
Earnings  Anncmt. Return: 
FFPM [-1,+1]
Average Absolute Value of Fama French Plus Mometum 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns Surrounding Quarterly Earnings 
Announcement [-1,+1]
Earnings  Anncmt. Return: 
FFPM [-3,+3]
Average Absolute Value of Fama French Plus Mometum 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns Surrounding Quarterly Earnings 
Announcement [-3,+3]
Table One: Variable Names and Descriptions
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
 
 
 
Transparency: N Mean Median Standard	Deviation 25% 75% Min Max
Press	Releases	(8Ks)	1	year	prior	to	approval 260 16.5769 14 10.5156 10.25 18 2 52
#	of	Analyst	Covering	company	at	the	approval	+1 260 14.2115 10 10.2172 6 25 0 33
Natural	Log	of	Press	Releases	(8Ks)	1	year	prior	to	
approval	+	1
260 1.1887 1.1761 0.2111 1.0508 1.2788 0.4771 1.7243
Natural	Log	of	#	of	Analyst	Covering	company	at	the	
approval	+1
260 1.0636 1.0414 0.3454 0.8451 1.4150 0.0000 1.5315
Returns	Surrounding	Phase	III	Approval: N Mean Median Standard	Deviation 25% 75% Min Max
Absolute	Value	of	Market	Model	Cumulative	
Abnormal	Returns	Surrounding	Phase	3	approvals	[-
3,+3]
260 0.0559 0.0390 0.0530 0.0145 0.0786 0.0001 0.1824
Absolute	Value	of	Market	Model	Cumulative	
Abnormal	Returns	Surrounding	Phase	3	approvals	[-
1,+1]
260 0.0379 0.0250 0.0367 0.0097 0.0549 0.0000 0.1298
Absolute	Value	of	Fama	French	Plus	Momentum	
Cumulative	Abnormal	Returns	Surrounding	Phase	3	
approvals	[-3,+3]
260 0.0574 0.0381 0.0552 0.0136 0.0832 0.0002 0.1822
Absolute	Value	of	Fama	French	Plus	Momentum	
Cumulative	Abnormal	Returns	Surrounding	Phase	3	
approvals	[-1,+1]
260 0.0377 0.0249 0.0359 0.0091 0.0572 0.0000 0.1225
Returns	Surrounding	Quarterly	Earnings	
Announcements:
N Mean Median Standard	Deviation 25% 75% Min Max
Average	Absolute	Value	of	Market	Model	Cumulative	
Abnormal	Returns	Surrounding	Quarterly	Earnings	
Announcement	[-1,+1]
253 0.0556 0.0490 0.0342 0.0302 0.0735 0.0038 0.1409
Average	Absolute	Value	of	Market	Model	Cumulative	
Abnormal	Returns	Surrounding	Quarterly	Earnings	
Announcement	[-3,+3]
253 0.0748 0.0602 0.0453 0.0405 0.1006 0.0119 0.1822
Average	Absolute	Value	of	Fama	French	Plus	
Momentum	Cumulative	Abnormal	Returns	
Surrounding	Quarterly	Earnings	Announcement	[-
1,+1]
253 0.0548 0.0447 0.0333 0.0282 0.0734 0.0024 0.1340
Average	Absolute	Value	of	Fama	French	Plus	
Momentum	Cumulative	Abnormal	Returns	
Surrounding	Quarterly	Earnings	Announcement	[-
3,+3]
253 0.0745 0.0611 0.0481 0.0366 0.1014 0.0110 0.1909
Financial	Control	Variables	(in	millions): N Mean Median Standard	Deviation 25% 75% Min Max
Total	Assets 254 29,336.10$		 390.88$						 47,771.68$															 102.16$					 51,536.00$		 3.64$													 152,807.00$		
Capital	Expenditures	 254 264.91$								 3.31$											 446.35$																				 0.17$									 398.18$							 -$														 1,533.00$						
EPS	Diluted	Including	Extraordinary	Items 256 0.08-$												 0.31-$											 2.16$																								 1.07-$									 1.14$												 8.51-$													 4.37$														
Net	Income 256 1,292.68$					 12.98-$								 2,643.72$																	 48.33-$							 1,416.18$				 5,325.00-$					 8,719.00$						
Operaing	Income	After	Depreciation 255 1,927.95$					 10.12-$								 3,381.97$																	 42.47-$							 3,133.00$				 445.74-$								 11,041.00$				
In	Processs	R+D 256 27.73$										 -$												 82.74$																						 -$											 -$													 -$														 343.00$									
Sales 256 7,245.57$					 37.15$								 11,842.35$															 0.80$									 12,757.75$		 -$														 38,843.00$				
Table	2:	Descriptives
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Table 3: Correlation Matrix 
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ATQ CAPXY EPSFIY NIY OIADPY RDIPY SALEY
Earnings  
Anncmt. 
Return: MM 
[-1,+1]
Earnings  
Anncmt. 
Return: MM 
[-3,+3]
Earnings  
Anncmt. 
Return: 
FFPM [-1,+1]
Earnings  
Anncmt. 
Return: FFPM 
[-3,+3]
1 -0.01231 0.00313 -0.00133 0.02241 -0.00106 1 -0.01231 0.08461 0.03228 -0.12479 -0.12537 -0.13495 -0.22107 0.06363 -0.00254 -0.00446 -0.01468 0.0058
0.8434 0.9599 0.983 0.7191 0.9864 <.0001 0.8434 0.1789 0.6086 0.0461 0.0451 0.0312 0.0004 0.3105 0.968 0.9437 0.8162 0.9269
-0.01231 1 -0.38974 -0.40156 -0.37631 -0.39229 -0.01231 1 0.81944 0.76478 0.44881 0.33085 0.42035 0.4567 0.74989 -0.43079 -0.50372 -0.4602 -0.50507
0.8434 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.8434 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
0.00313 -0.38974 1 0.61073 0.81598 0.56741 0.00313 -0.38974 -0.51769 -0.48517 -0.40019 -0.38575 -0.43473 -0.30346 -0.50257 0.3643 0.4171 0.36348 0.43353
0.9599 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.9599 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
-0.00133 -0.40156 0.61073 1 0.56706 0.79619 -0.00133 -0.40156 -0.52042 -0.51124 -0.37632 -0.39109 -0.4366 -0.27216 -0.48262 0.39297 0.39661 0.39775 0.41504
0.983 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.983 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
0.02241 -0.37631 0.81598 0.56706 1 0.58626 0.02241 -0.37631 -0.50161 -0.47939 -0.42886 -0.43432 -0.49047 -0.28017 -0.50324 0.3773 0.38717 0.36695 0.39457
0.7191 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.7191 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
-0.00106 -0.39229 0.56741 0.79619 0.58626 1 -0.00106 -0.39229 -0.52674 -0.50897 -0.37104 -0.37464 -0.43664 -0.27366 -0.48905 0.32763 0.35509 0.35433 0.3998
0.9864 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.9864 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
1 -0.01231 0.00313 -0.00133 0.02241 -0.00106 1 -0.01231 0.08461 0.03228 -0.12479 -0.12537 -0.13495 -0.22107 0.06363 -0.00254 -0.00446 -0.01468 0.0058
<.0001 0.8434 0.9599 0.983 0.7191 0.9864 0.8434 0.1789 0.6086 0.0461 0.0451 0.0312 0.0004 0.3105 0.968 0.9437 0.8162 0.9269
-0.01231 1 -0.38974 -0.40156 -0.37631 -0.39229 -0.01231 1 0.81944 0.76478 0.44881 0.33085 0.42035 0.4567 0.74989 -0.43079 -0.50372 -0.4602 -0.50507
0.8434 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.8434 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
0.08461 0.81944 -0.51769 -0.52042 -0.50161 -0.52674 0.08461 0.81944 1 0.92699 0.5736 0.49571 0.56468 0.42023 0.91393 -0.54001 -0.6372 -0.57328 -0.64676
0.1789 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.1789 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
0.03228 0.76478 -0.48517 -0.51124 -0.47939 -0.50897 0.03228 0.76478 0.92699 1 0.58628 0.49948 0.57998 0.42605 0.90807 -0.51219 -0.6281 -0.54639 -0.62993
0.6086 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.6086 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
-0.12479 0.44881 -0.40019 -0.37632 -0.42886 -0.37104 -0.12479 0.44881 0.5736 0.58628 1 0.88714 0.84867 0.2996 0.67172 -0.49542 -0.51946 -0.50468 -0.50658
0.0461 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0461 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
-0.12537 0.33085 -0.38575 -0.39109 -0.43432 -0.37464 -0.12537 0.33085 0.49571 0.49948 0.88714 1 0.9091 0.2049 0.56557 -0.53749 -0.50632 -0.50517 -0.47271
0.0451 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0451 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
-0.13495 0.42035 -0.43473 -0.4366 -0.49047 -0.43664 -0.13495 0.42035 0.56468 0.57998 0.84867 0.9091 1 0.36361 0.64609 -0.55066 -0.52816 -0.51227 -0.49278
0.0312 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0312 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
-0.22107 0.4567 -0.30346 -0.27216 -0.28017 -0.27366 -0.22107 0.4567 0.42023 0.42605 0.2996 0.2049 0.36361 1 0.44566 -0.27738 -0.35163 -0.28684 -0.35212
0.0004 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0004 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
0.06363 0.74989 -0.50257 -0.48262 -0.50324 -0.48905 0.06363 0.74989 0.91393 0.90807 0.67172 0.56557 0.64609 0.44566 1 -0.5156 -0.64784 -0.55089 -0.65671
0.3105 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.3105 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
-0.00254 -0.43079 0.3643 0.39297 0.3773 0.32763 -0.00254 -0.43079 -0.54001 -0.51219 -0.49542 -0.53749 -0.55066 -0.27738 -0.5156 1 0.77651 0.94756 0.74031
0.968 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.968 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
-0.00446 -0.50372 0.4171 0.39661 0.38717 0.35509 -0.00446 -0.50372 -0.6372 -0.6281 -0.51946 -0.50632 -0.52816 -0.35163 -0.64784 0.77651 1 0.77057 0.94374
0.9437 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.9437 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
-0.01468 -0.4602 0.36348 0.39775 0.36695 0.35433 -0.01468 -0.4602 -0.57328 -0.54639 -0.50468 -0.50517 -0.51227 -0.28684 -0.55089 0.94756 0.77057 1 0.78019
0.8162 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.8162 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
0.0058 -0.50507 0.43353 0.41504 0.39457 0.3998 0.0058 -0.50507 -0.64676 -0.62993 -0.50658 -0.47271 -0.49278 -0.35212 -0.65671 0.74031 0.94374 0.78019 1
0.9269 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.9269 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
ATQ
eightk
coverage
abs_three_mm_ca
r
Spearman Correlation Coefficients
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r
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3,+3]
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Table 4: Cumulative Abnormal Returns Market Model -1, +1 Window 
 Dependent variable: 
 -1/+1 Market Model 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Natural Log 
Coverage 
-0.035***  -0.034***  -0.033*** 
 (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.007) 
Natural Log 
Press Releases 
 -0.012 -0.010  -0.010 
  (0.011) (0.010)  (0.010) 
Earnings    0.280*** 0.165** 
    (0.066) (0.068) 
Constant 0.075*** 0.052*** 0.086*** 0.023*** 0.076*** 
 (0.007) (0.013) (0.014) (0.004) (0.015) 
Observations 260 260 260 253 253 
R^2 0.105 0.005 0.109 0.067 0.149 
Adjusted R^2 0.102 0.001 0.102 0.063 0.139 
Residual Std. Error 0.035 (df = 258) 
0.037 (df = 
258) 
0.035 (df = 257) 0.036 (df = 251) 0.034 (df = 249) 
F Statistic 
30.382*** (df = 1; 
258) 
1.245 (df = 1; 
258) 
15.665*** (df = 2; 
257) 
18.021*** (df = 1; 
251) 
14.508*** (df = 3; 
249) 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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Table 5:  Cumulative Abnormal Returns Market Model -3, +3 Window 
 
 Dependent variable: 
 -3/+3 Market Model 
 (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Natural Log 
Coverage 
-0.056***  -0.055***  -0.050*** 
 (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.010) 
Natural Log 
Press Releases 
 -0.017 -0.014  -0.013 
  (0.016) (0.015)  (0.014) 
Earnings    0.379*** 0.209*** 
    (0.070) (0.076) 
Constant 0.115*** 0.077*** 0.132*** 0.028*** 0.109*** 
 (0.010) (0.019) (0.020) (0.006) (0.023) 
Observations 260 260 260 253 253 
R^2 0.132 0.005 0.135 0.104 0.185 
Adjusted R^2 0.129 0.001 0.129 0.100 0.175 
Residual Std. Error 0.049 (df = 258) 
0.053 (df = 
258) 
0.049 (df = 257) 0.051 (df = 251) 0.048 (df = 249) 
F Statistic 
39.348*** (df = 1; 
258) 
1.240 (df = 1; 
258) 
20.134*** (df = 2; 
257) 
28.985*** (df = 1; 
251) 
18.809*** (df = 3; 
249) 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
32 
 
 
Table 6:  Cumulative Abnormal Returns Fama French Plus Momentum Model -1, +1 Window 
 
  
Dependent variable: 
 -1/+1 Fama French Plus Momentum 
 (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
Natural Log 
Coverage 
-0.036***  -0.036***  -0.035*** 
 (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.007) 
Natural Log 
Press Releases 
 -0.012 -0.010  -0.010 
  (0.011) (0.010)  (0.010) 
Earnings    0.283*** 0.142** 
    (0.066) (0.069) 
Constant 0.076*** 0.052*** 0.088*** 0.023*** 0.079*** 
 (0.007) (0.013) (0.013) (0.004) (0.015) 
Observations 260 260 260 253 253 
R^2 0.123 0.005 0.126 0.068 0.160 
Adjusted R^2 0.119 0.001 0.119 0.064 0.150 
Residual Std. 
Error 
0.034 (df = 258) 0.036 (df = 258) 0.034 (df = 257) 0.035 (df = 251) 0.033 (df = 249) 
F Statistic 
36.030*** (df = 
1; 258) 
1.278 (df = 1; 258) 18.499*** (df = 2; 257) 
18.251*** (df = 
1; 251) 
15.776*** (df = 
3; 249) 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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Table 7:  Cumulative Abnormal Returns Fama French Plus Momentum Model -3, +3 Window 
 Dependent variable: 
 -3/+3 Fama French Plus Momentum 
 (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) 
Natural Log 
Coverage 
-0.054 ***  -0.054 ***  -0.046 *** 
 (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.011) 
Natural Log 
Press Releases 
 -0.021 -0.018  -0.017 
  (0.016) (0.015)  (0.015) 
Earnings    0.365 *** 0.212 *** 
    (0.069) (0.076) 
Constant 0.115 *** 0.082 *** 0.136 *** 0.031 *** 0.112 *** 
 (0.010) (0.020) (0.021) (0.006) (0.024) 
Observations 260 260 260 253 253 
R^2 0.115 0.006 0.119 0.099 0.166 
Adjusted R^2 0.111 0.003 0.113 0.096 0.156 
Residual Std. 
Error 
0.052 (df = 258) 
0.055 (df = 
258) 
0.052 (df = 257) 0.053 (df = 251) 0.051 (df = 249) 
F Statistic 
33.482 *** (df = 1; 
258) 
1.671 (df = 1; 
258) 
17.436 *** (df = 2; 
257) 
27.629 *** (df = 1; 
251) 
16.530 *** (df = 3; 
249) 
Note: *p <0.1; **p <0.05; ***p <0.01 
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Table 8: Above and Below Median Transparency 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Press Releases (8Ks) 1 year prior to approval Below Median Above Median Difference P Value
Phase 3 Approval Anncmt.
 Return: MM [-1,+1]
0.03698 0.03879 0.00180 0.69290
Phase 3 Approval Anncmt.
 Return:FFPM [-1,+1]
0.03650 0.03881 0.00232 0.60397
# of Analyst Covering company at the annoucement Below Median Above Median Difference P Value
Phase 3 Approval Anncmt.
 Return: MM [-1,+1]
0.04892 0.02685 -0.02207 7.60094E-07
Phase 3 Approval Anncmt.
 Return:FFPM [-1,+1]
0.04841 0.02690 -0.02151 8.27861E-07
Earnings  Anncmt. Return: MM [-1,+1] Below Median Above Median Difference P Value
Phase 3 Approval Anncmt.
 Return: MM [-1,+1]
0.02824 0.04753 0.01930 1.71553E-05
Earnings  Anncmt. Return: FFPM [-1,+1] Below Median Above Median Difference P Value
Phase 3 Approval Anncmt.
 Return:FFPM [-1,+1]
0.02869 0.04662 0.01793 4.54536E-05
Table 8 Breakdown Above and Below Median
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Table 9: Most Versus Least Transparent Firms 
Most Vs. Least Transparent 
Model High Transparency Low Transparency Difference P-Value 
Phase 3 Approval Anncmt. 
Return: MM [-1,+1] 
0.04868 0.08418 -0.03550 0.03869 
Phase 3 Approval Anncmt. 
Return:FFPM [-1,+1] 
0.04759 0.07778 -0.03019 0.04306 
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Table 10: Cumulative Abnormal Returns Fama French Plus Momentum Model -1, +1 Window 
with Dummy Variable for Least Transparent: 
 
 Dependent variable: 
 -1/+1 Fama French Plus Momentum 
(21) 
Natural Log Coverage -0.003 
 (0.010) 
Natural Log 
Press Releases 
-0.029*** 
 (0.007) 
Earnings 0.179** 
 (0.070) 
Least Transparent 0.022** 
 (0.011) 
Constant 0.063*** 
 (0.017) 
Observations 252 
R^2 0.171 
Adjusted R^2 0.158 
Residual Std. Error 0.033 (df = 247) 
F Statistic 12.745*** (df = 4; 247) 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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Table 11: Fama French Plus Momentum Model Nonlinear Coverage 
 
 Dependent variable: 
 -1/+1 Fama French Plus Momentum 
 (22) (23) 
Natural Log 
Coverage 
-0.036*** 0.057** 
 (0.006) (0.029) 
Natural Log  
Coverage Squared 
 -0.047*** 
  (0.014) 
Constant 0.076*** 0.036*** 
 (0.007) (0.014) 
Observations 260 260 
R2 0.123 0.158 
Adjusted R2 0.119 0.152 
Residual Std. Error 0.034 (df = 258) 0.033 (df = 257) 
F Statistic 36.030*** (df = 1; 258) 24.177*** (df = 2; 257) 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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Chart One: Distribution of Analyst Coverage (1 Year Prior to Phase III Approval) 
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Table 12: Fama French Plus Momentum Model Coverage and Earnings Interaction 
 Dependent variable: 
 -1/+1 Fama French Plus Momentum 
 (24) (25) 
Natural Log 
 Coverage 
-0.035*** -0.043*** 
 (0.007) (0.012) 
Earnings 0.145** -0.016 
 (0.069) (0.222) 
Interaction  0.155 
  (0.202) 
Constant 0.067*** 0.076*** 
 (0.010) (0.015) 
Observations 253 253 
R^2 0.156 0.158 
Adjusted R^2 0.150 0.148 
Residual Std. Error 0.033 (df = 250) 0.033 (df = 249) 
F Statistic 23.150*** (df = 2; 250) 15.602*** (df = 3; 249) 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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